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The Fourteenth Amendment
and the Right of Privacy
Roscoe Pound
[Beginning with the common-law concept of trespass vi et
armis, analyzing the cases which established the right, and ex-
amining the statutes which limit it, the author traces the origin
and development of the right of privacy and discusses the ex-
tent of its present recognition. He maintains that the require-
ments of due process are satisfied by an equitable balancing of
the right of the individual to be let alone against the often con-
flicting right of a free press protected by the fourteenth
amendment. - Ed.]
EVOLUTION OF A NEW RIGHT: By STATUTE OR
BY JUDICIAL DECISION?
Under this title we raise some fundamental and far-reaching ques-
tions. How far may we introduce a new right into the body of those
recognized and secured by law otherwise than by legislation? Are there
limits to the development of
law by judicial decision, hold-
THE AUTHOR is University Professor 
Emeritus
and former Dean of the Harvard Law School. ing it to subjects for which the
common law had definitely
made provision, so that new
categories of secured interests must be recognized and provided with
definitions, an apparatus of rights and duties, or at least assigned to treat-
ment on specified lines or under specified categories, by legislation? How
far is this established by the constitutional separation of powers? In a
constitutional polity the science of law cannot ignore or evade these ques-
tions. Law may come into being through lawmaking by the legislature
or through lawfinding by the courts. But on the one hand the province
of legislation, lawmaking by laying down precepts for the administration
of justice, extends to very much more than rules of policing - regula-
tions of items of conduct. On the other hand, even in the world of the
civil law, where law is in theory fully set forth in codes, admitting only
of genuine interpretation and application, in the world of today it is rec-
ognized that judicial application is a creative function no less than juris-
tic exposition, and in the common-law world judicial decision is a form
of law.
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Legal history has amply shown that the whole content of the legal
order cannot be set forth, item by item for all time to come, in either leg-
islatively prescribed or judicially found precepts. When I look back at
what I was taught as the law of torts as a student of law in 1889 in com-
parison with what is taught today, or at what was then taken for granted
as to the importance of local rules of law, laid down for local communi-
ties, and reflect on the steady growth of a law of the world, administered
by local courts without imposition by Tennyson's Parliament of Man, I
come to suspect that belief in and hope for world peace through world
law imposed by a world superstate, and of self-sufficing local law imposed
by local legislation, are delusive.
At any rate, as the matter stands today in this country, the law as to
a right of privacy has not been helped by legislation to establish a right
where it had been denied by judicial decision. The malleability of stare
decisis does not apply to legislation. If the right of privacy is purely a
creation for legislation, to be interpreted by the technique of statutory
interpretation, response of the law to changing conditions of the time in
what is beginning to be a subject increasingly before the courts will be
greatly embarrassed.
We attain the ends of the law by recognizing certain interests, defin-
ing the limits within which these interests will be given effect through
legal precepts, developed and applied by the judicial and administrative
processes according to an authoritative technique, and endeavoring to se-
cure the interests so defined within the defined limits. In this way of
putting the task of the law, an interest is a demand or desire or expecta-
tion which human beings either individually or in groups or associations
seek to satisfy, of which therefore the adjustment of relations and ordering
of conduct must take account. There is no record of any time or society in
which there has been a surplus of means of satisfying these demands or
desires, or room for everyone to do all he sought or urged a claim to do,
so that there has not been competition to satisfy them. Conflicts and
competition of individuals with each other, of groups or associations or
societies of men with each other, and of individuals with such groups or
associations or societies in the endeavor to satisfy human wants and claims
or desires, require the systematic adjustment of relations and ordering of
conduct which may be called the legal order (ordre juridique, Rechts-
ordnung).
In civilized society as we know it there is a fundamental presupposi-
tion that individuals must be able to assume that others will commit no
intentional aggressions upon them. Hence one who intentionally does
anything which on its face is injurious to another is held liable to repair
the resulting damage, unless he can establish a liberty, or privilege, by
identifying his daim to do what he did with some recognized public or
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social interest. It is here that we come upon serious difficulties for de-
fining and fixing the limits of the right of privacy.
EARLY HISTORY OF THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
Injury to personality, aggression upon the physical person, was the
first subject to be dealt with in the beginnings of law and furnished an
analogy which long worked mischief in the development of legal proce-
dure. It is true that physical attack was first thought of as an attack upon
the honor of the person attacked. But as the law of delicts or torts de-
veloped that aspect was forgotten and the old writ of trespass vi et armis,
which recited an attack with "swords, knives and staves," furnished the
controlling analogy until the present century. Hence when in 1890 the
memorable paper of Warren and Brandeis' expounded a right of privacy
infringed without attack upon the physical person or deprivation of sub-
stance, it was regarded as a highly doubtful stretching of the supposedly
fundamental analogy of trespass with force and arms.
In writing upon the right of privacy much is said not only about com-
petition with other individual interests or individual interests of others
than the complainant, and much has been said also as to conflict of an
individual interest with "the public interest." But in treatment of com-
peting interests we must not prejudge the question by the way in which
we put it. There is a social advantage in securing the wants or claims of
each as well as those of many or all of us, and because more of us read
newspapers than are written up in newspapers, it does not follow that the
feelings of each of us are to be wholly at the mercy of the press. The
date of the first newspaper in English is usually put at 1622.2 Sensation-
al journalism in the United States is dated from Joseph Pulitzer's acquisi-
tion of the New York World in 1883 and William Randolph Hearst's
acquisition of the New York Journal in 1895.? It is significant that we
first hear of the right of privacy in 1890 in an argument for "the right
of one who has remained a private individual, to prevent his public por-
traiture . . . from pen portraiture, from a discussion by the press of one's
private affairs . . ." at this time.4
Indeed, twenty years before Warren and Brandeis, Thomas McIntyre
Cooley, one of the ten judges who must be ranked first in our judicial his-
tory,5 had written of "the right to be let alone."' Today, when the im-
pact of social change on our principal legal institutions is attracting the
1. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890).
2. 16 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 337 (1961).
3. Id. at 350, 351.
4. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 213 (1890).
5. See PoUND, THE FORMATrVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAw 4, 30-31 n. 2 (1938).
6. COOLEY, TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888).
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attention of jurists,7 the development of a legal right of privacy out of the
prophetic article of Warren and Brandeis is especially significant. The
right of privacy is a modern demand growing out of the conditions of
life in the crowded communities of today. Publicity as to private matters
of purely personal concern is an injury to personality in a time when mod-
ern means of gathering and transmitting news make everyone a next door
neighbor of everyone else whether he will or not. Indeed, impairment of
the peace and comfort of the individual may produce suffering more acute
than that brought about by mere bodily injury. But since the injury is
mental and subjective there are difficulties in securing the interest of the
person whose privacy is invaded, which put limits to legal remedy. In
many cases of weighing of interests, the over sensitive must give way, and
the balance as between legitimate public curiosity and individual sensi-
tiveness may be hard to attain or maintain. But the aggressions of a type
of unscrupulous journalism, activities of photographers, and temptation
of advertisers to sacrifice private feelings to their individual gain have
been calling upon the law to do more by way of securing the individual
interest than merely take incidental account of infringements of it.
Warren and Brandeis' article in the Harvard Law Review was cited
within a year after its publication in a suit for an injunction brought by
an eminent British physician whose name was used without permission
in advertising a remedy for catarrh as recommended by him.' It was
again cited two years later by a superior court of New York in granting
an injunction at suit of an actor against the publisher of a newspaper who
was publishing a picture of plaintiff and another actor and inviting read-
ers to vote which was the more popular.9 Both these cases might be said
to involve to some extent infringement of an interest of substance, in that
the plaintiff had a valuable professional reputation. The New York
court quoted Cooley's saying that the plaintiff had a "right to be let
alone."'"
Almost ten years later the question came before the highest court of
New York and it reached the opposite conclusion by a divided court."
The complaint alleged that the defendant Franklin Mills Company
printed some twenty-five thousand lithograph prints of a portrait of the
plaintiff, a young woman, without her consent, advertising a brand of
7. See FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A CHANGING SOcIETY (1959).
8. Brief of Simon Sterne, Esq., in MacKenzie v. Soden Mineral Springs Co., 27 Abb. N. Cas.
402, 408 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1891).
9. Marks v. Jaffa, 6 Misc. 290, 292, 26 N.Y.S. 908, 909 (Super. Ct. 1893).
10. Ibid.
11. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902). This
decision was sharply criticised at the time in the New York Times, Aug. 23, 1902, p. 8, col. 3,
and was defended by Judge Denis O'Brien, The Right of Privacy, 2 CoL.UN L. REV. 437
(1902). ,-_,;j
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flour, and bearing in capital letters the names "Franklin Mills Flour and
Rochester Folding Box Co.," that the portraits so printed were "displayed
in stores, warehouses, saloons and other public places, were recognized as
pictures of the plaintiff by her friends and others," so that she was "great-
ly humiliated by the scoffs and jeers of those who recognized the por-
trait" as hers, causing her great distress and suffering both in body and
mind, a nervous shock, and illness compelling her to employ a physician.
The trial court having overruled demurrers of the defendant the appellate
court entered an interlocutory judgment for the plaintiff. In the highest
court two questions were certified: (1) Did the complaint state a cause
of action at law? (2) Did it state a cause of action in equity? A divided
court (four judges to three) answered both questions in the negative.
In the opinion of the majority, Chief Judge Parker, after citing the
article of Warren and Brandeis, suggested that a vast field of litigation
would necessarily be opened up should the court "hold that privacy exists
as a legal right enforceable in equity by injunction and by damages when
they seem necessary to give complete relief." Next he pointed out that
the right of privacy "as a legal doctrine enforceable in equity has not
down to this time been established by decisions."'" He then went over
the English cases discussed by Warren and Brandeis and came to the con-
clusion that they did not in any way support the position of plaintiff. Nor
could he find any support for the plaintiff in any prior decision in New
York. Finding no support for a right of privacy in authority, he pro-
ceeded to deny its validity in principle.
Then he quoted an eloquent passage from Justice Lumpkin of
Georgia."3
The law protects the person and the purse .... The body, reputation,
and property of the citizen are not to be invaded without responsibility
in damages to the sufferer... There are many moral obligations too deli-
cate and subtle to be enforced in the rude way of giving money com-
pensation for their violation. Perhaps the feelings find as full protection
as it is possible to give, in moral law and a responsive public opinion.
The civil law is a practical business system, dealing with what is tangi-
ble, and does not undertake to redress psychological injuries.
For the rest he relied upon Atkinson v. John E. Doherty & Co.,'4 which
no longer obtains as to the right of privacy in Michigan, and summed
up thus:
An examination of the authorities leads us to the conclusion that the
so-called "right of privacy" has not as yet found an abiding place in ourjurisprudence, and, as we view it, the doctrine cannot now be incorpo-
rated without doing violence to settled principles of law by which the
profession and the public have long been guided.
12. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 563, 64 N.E. 442, 447 (1902).
13. Chapman v. Western Union Tel. Co., 88 Ga. 763, 772-73, 15 S.E. 901, 903 (1892).
14. 121 Mich. 372, 80 N.W. 285 (1899).
[Vol. 13:1
Pound, Right of Ptivacy
There was a strong dissenting opinion by Judge Gray who said:
The proposition is, to me, an inconceivable one that these defendants
may, unauthorizedly, use the likeness of this young woman upon their
advertisement, as a method of attracting widespread public attention to
their wares, and that she must submit to the mortifying notoriety,
without right to invoke the exercise of the preventive power of a court
of equity.' 5
A change in approach began in Georgia in 1904 with Pavesich t .
New England Life Insurance Company.6 In that case the insurance com-
pany published in a newspaper a likeness of the plaintiff, which was rec-
ognized by his friends and acquaintances, beside one of an ill dressed and
sickly looking person. Above the likeness of the plaintiff were the
words: "Do it now. The man who did," and below, "In my healthy and
productive period of life I bought insurance in the New England Mutual
Life Insurance Co., of Boston, Mass., and to-day my family is protected
•and I am drawing an annual dividend on my paid-up policies." Above
the other were the words: "The man who didn't," and a statement that
he now realized his mistake. Below them both were the words: "These
two pictures tell their own story." The picture of the plaintiff was made
without his consent from a negative procured without his consent and the
statement attributed to him was false. He had never made such a state-
ment and had never been insured by the defendant company. He was
an artist by profession and the publication was peculiarly offensive to
him. The lower court sustained a demurrer. This was reversed. The
court in a thirty page opinion followed the dissent of Judge Gray in the
New York case and rejected the arguments of Chief Judge Parker.'7
EXTENT OF RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT OF PRIvAcy
As late as 1949, when I wrote chapter fourteen of my book Jurispru-
dence, I could not say with assurance that the right was coming to be fully
and adequately secured in American courts.' 8 However, in the increas-
ingly crowded society of today the lot of the individual who desires to be
let alone has been coming to be made hard beyond reasonable limits of
endurance on his part and the need for enlightenment or entertainment
on the part of his neighbors. The advent of radio, television, and wide-
spread telecommunication aggravates this. If a balance of conflicting or
overlapping interests is becoming increasingly difficult, there is the more
reason why it should be determined and maintained by law rather than
left to the mercy of those who profit by the annoying activity.
15. 171 N.Y. 538, 563, 64 N.E. 442, 450 (1902).
16. 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
17. Id. at 213, 50 S.E. at 78.
18. As to the dates of the final draft of each chapter, see volume I, page xii.
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Accordingly, the right of privacy today has become recognized by
judicial decision in twenty-six states and the District of Columbia, is given
wide, if limited recognition by statute in four states, and is wholly denied
in but four. Moreover, in a number of others, where lower courts have
recognized it, the highest court has at least spoken no word to indicate
that it does not exist. 9 Also it has now come to be well recognized by
American text writers.20 It was discussed by a learned English law
teacher in 1931.21 Also it was shown that the German law on the sub-
ject was more effective than either American or English law,2" and we
are told much the same as to French law.2 In the last edition of Sir
Percy Winfield's book there is a section entitled "Doubtful Wrongs,"
which comes to the conclusion that "while the question is still open for
legislation or in the House of Lords, there are strong arguments for some
remedy."2 4  In the eleventh edition of Salmond on Torts we are told that
the right "is not yet recognized" in England, 5 and this is repeated cau-
tiously in the twelfth edition. 6 Perhaps invasion of privacy has not be-
come so frequent or so aggravated in England as yet as it has with us.
Moreover, recognition in England of "parasitic damages"2 7 suggests
that the parasite may yet become an independent self-sufficient cause of
action. Street, who first called attention to this doctrine and gave it a
name, said:
The treatment of any element of damage as a parasitic factor belongs
essentially to a transitory stage of legal evolution. A factor which is
to-day recognized as parasitic will, forsooth, to-morrow be recognized
as an independent basis of liability. It is merely a question of social,
economic, and industrial needs as those needs are reflected in the
organic law.
28
Harper and James have noted a like course of development in American
law in cases where mental suffering was caused by conduct of the de-
fendant which amounted to a technical trespass to real property, and
courts before establishment of the right of privacy used the opportunity
19. The cases and statutes down to 1955 are fully set forth in PROSSER, TORTS 636-37 nn.
10-40 (2d ed. 1955). See also Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383-84 nn. 17-58 (1960),
for subsequent cases and statutes.
20. PROSSER, TORTS ch. 20 (2d ed. 1955); 1 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS chs. 3-5 (1956);
SEAvEY, KEETON & KEETON, CASES ON TORTS ch. 14 § A (1957).
21. Winfield, Privacy, 47 L.Q. REV. 23 (1931).
22. Gutteridge, The Comparative Law of the Right to Privacy: The Law of Germany and
Switzerland, 47 IQ. REV. 203 (1931).
23. Walton, The Comparative Law of the Right of Privacy: The French Law as to the Right
of Privacy, 47 L.Q. REV. 219 (1931).
24. WINFIELD, TORTS 775 (6th ed. 1954).
25. HEUSTON, SALMOND ON TORTS 19 n. 1 (11th ed. 1953).
26. Id. ch. 2 n. 56 (12th ed. 1957).
27. Jackson v. Watson & Sons, [1909] 2 K.B. 193.
28. 1 STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 470 (1906).
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"as a peg on which to hang relief" although the real harm was to a right
to be let alone 9
Today American law teachers and text writers have accepted the right
of privacy as sound common-law doctrine."0 Yet as late as 1942 an ex-
perienced law editor could tell us that "in a majority of the states even
the existence of the right of privacy is still an undetermined question."
31
In the twenty years since that was written, in addition to the eight state
supreme courts which had already adopted the right judicially, eighteen
more jurisdictions have expressly adopted it by decisions of their courts.
It has also been established, at least to a limited extent, by legislation in
four more. 2 Also the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has as-
serted that whether there is a "legally protected right of privacy" is an
open question in that state.33 Finally, the American Law Institute in its
Restatement of the Law of Torts laid down as an accepted proposition of
American common law, under the heading "Interference with Privacy:"
A person who unreasonably and seriously interferes with another's
interest in not having his affairs known to others or his likeness exhibited
to the public, is liable to the other.34
In the Restatement's comment on this proposition it is explained that
"modern decisions allow recovery in situations in which it is not possible
rationally to use the older bases of recovery, and the interest is now recog-
nized as having an independent existence."35  The accompanying state-
ment as to conflict of interests and protection of the interest in relation
to the customs of the time and place and to the habits and occupation of
the complainant, and the incidents of community life of which he is a
part, such as the possibility that he be photographed as part of a street
scene, is admirable both for its breadth and the carefully put details and
limitations. The statement as to conditions of liability is also admirable.
If these conditions are met, the conclusion is reached that "the fact that
the plaintiff suffered neither pecuniary loss nor physical harm is unim-
portant. The damages whether nominal, compensatory or punitive can
be awarded in the same way in which general damages are given for
defamation."3 6
29. 1 H-ARPER & JAMEs, TORTS 678 (1956), citing particularly Adams v. Rivers, 11 Barb.
390 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1851).
30. Seavey, Can Texas Courts Protect Newly-Discovered Interests?, 31 TExAs L. REv. 309
(1931); PRossER, TORTS ch. 20 (2d ed. 1955); HARPER & JAMEs, ToaTs § 9.5 (1956).
31. 41 AM. Jtl., Privac-y § 4 (1942).
32. The cases down to 1955 are cited fully state by state in PROSSER, TORTS 636-37 nn. 10,
12-31 (1955). Discussions in legal periodicals are cited at 636 n. 7. See Prosser, Privacy,
48 CALIF. L. REv. 383, 386-88 (1960), for subsequent cases.
33. Kelley v. Post Publishing Co., 327 Mass. 275, 277, 98 N.E.2d 286, 287 (1951).
34. 4 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 867 (1939).
35. Id. at 399.
36. Id. at 401.
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What we must take into account in considering the right of privacy
as now secured in American courts is brought out by consideration of
some typical cases in which it has come before our courts.
FACTORS IN ALLOWING OR DENYING RECOVERY FOR VIOLATION
OF THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
Intrusion upon Privacy for Commercial Purposes
Taking the cases up in order of time, in the pioneer case of Pavesich v.
New England Life Insurance Company," spoken of above, it will be re-
membered that the plaintiff, who was known to his neighbors in a com-
munity sensitive on personal honor, as a quiet, unobtrusive person, found
his picture in a newspaper in an advertisement of an insurance company
of another state with a wholly false statement that he was insured in that
company and in receipt of an annual dividend on his paid up policy. The
picture had been procured without his knowledge or participation, and
there was no foundation whatever for publication of the picture or for the
statement attributed to the plaintiff. There was no excuse whatever for
thus publicly representing him as a cheap seeker for notoriety as a means
of advertising the insurance company's business.
In Kunz v. Allen,8 as stated in the opinion of the court, while plain-
tiff was in the store of defendant to make some purchases, defendant,
without her knowledge, caused moving pictures to be taken of her face,
form, and garments, and the films to be developed, enlarged, and used to
advertise his business by public exhibition in a moving picture theater in
the community where she lived. It was alleged that it was understood
and believed among the people generally that she had for hire permitted
her picture to be taken and used as a public advertisement. The trial
court sustained a demurrer to this evidence. This was reversed.
An interesting question as to the extent of the right was raised in
Brents v. Morgan.3" The defendant put in the show window of his
garage fronting on a principal street of the city where plaintiff lived, a
notice posted on a sign five by eight feet and conspicuous to anyone pass-
ing on the street. It read: "Notice. Dr. W. H. Morgan owes an account
here of $49.67. And if promises would pay an account this account
would have been settled long ago. This account will be advertised as long
as it remains unpaid." It was held that this was an unwarranted invasion
of the right of privacy and that truth was no defense.
In Flake v. Greensboro News Company the court said that
the unauthorized use of one's photograph in connection with an adver-
37. 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1904).
38. 102 Kan. 883, 172 Pac. 532 (1918).
39. 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927).
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tisement or other commercial enterprise gives rise to a cause of action
which would entitle the plaintiff, without allegation and proof of special
damages, to a judgment for nominal damages, and to injunctive relief, if
and when the wrong is persisted in by the offending parties. 40
Intrusion upon Privacy by the Press: A Constitutionally Protected
Competing Right
In Barber v. Time, Incorporated,41 the court had to consider the right
of privacy in relation to the guarantee of freedom of the press in the state
constitution and to the fourteenth amendment, which must be considered
presently. On the question of a right of privacy the court in a character-
istically able opinion by Commissioner Hyde said:
Thus, establishing conditions of liability for invasion of the right of
privacy is a matter of harmonizing individual rights with community
and social interests. We think they can be harmonized on a reasonable
basis, recognizing the right of privacy without abridging freedom of
the press. The determination of what is a matter of public concern is
similar in principle to qualified privilege in libel. It is for the court to
say first whether the occasion or incident is one of proper public interest.
(As it must say whether an occasion is one to which qualified privilege
extends in libeL) ... If the court decides that the matter is outside the
scope of proper public interest and that there is substantial evidence
tending to show a serious, unreasonable, unwarranted and offensive
interference with another's private affairs, then the case is one to be
submitted to the jury. We think this is the rule to be deduced from the
best considered authorities .... We further hold that this rule (applied
to the facts of this case) does not interfere with the freedom of the
press or its effective exercise, but only limits its abuse; and does not
violate any of the constitutional provisions upon which defendant
relies.42
The case arose upon an article in a weekly news magazine, entitled
"Starving Glutton," accompanied by a picture of plaintiff, Mrs. Dorothy
Barber, under which was printed "Insatiable-Eater Barber," and "She
eats for ten." It went on to recite that she came to General Hospital say-
ing that she wanted to eat all the time; she could finish a normal meal
"and be back in the kitchen in ten minutes eating again." The picture was
taken against Mrs. Barber's will by trick after she had refused to allow it.
The name and picture were not needed for any legitimate purpose of
medical or scientific information.
A very significant point was made by the Supreme Court of Oregon
in 1941. It said:
When Brandeis and Warren wrote in 1890, it was the unseemly intru-
sions of a portion of the press into the privacy of the home that was
emphasized as the main source of evil; since then motion pictures and
40. 212 N.C. 780, 792, 195 S.E. 55, 64 (1937).
41. 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942).
42. Id. at 1206-07, 159 S.W.2d at 295.
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the radio have been perfected and have taken their places among our great
industries, while instantaneous photography today accomplishes miracles
scarcely dreamed of fifty years ago. Thus, the potentialities for this
character of wrong are now greatly multiplied. A decision against the
right of privacy would be nothing less than an invitation to those so in-
clined who control these instrumentalities of communication, informa-
tion and education, to put them to base uses, with complete immunity,
and without regard to the hurt done to the sensibilities of individuals
whose private affairs might be exploited, whether out of malice or for
selfish purposes.4
While an accused person was incarcerated awaiting trial the prose-
cuting authorities and the superintendent of state police were about taking
his finger prints and photograph and forwarding copies to rogues' galler-
ies in other states, to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and to police
departments of other countries. The trial court considered that taking
photographs, finger prints, and other criminal investigation data before
conviction was a justified precaution against escape, but enjoined pub-
lishing the data in advance of conviction unless the complainant became
a fugitive from justice. The court considered unnecessary premature pub-
lication an invasion of privacy.44
Writers of fiction, depicting eccentric or striking personalities, have
at times used habits or traits of particular persons, locally well known, as
characters. Carefully and skillfully done this is an inevitable incident of
legitimate literary activity. Dickens and Thackeray are known to have
used personal oddities of identifiable individuals in this way. But today
the opportunities for abuse are multiplying and the injuries to individuals
through abuse are multiplying also. A notable case in which it came be-
fore the courts is Cason v. Baskin.45 In that case a book called Cross
Creek, written by and published for the defendant, and widely read in the
locality where the plaintiff lived and was well-known, described her by
name. As alleged the book contains "what purports to be a biographical
sketch, description and partial life history of the plaintiff, in which the
name, form, words and actions of plaintiff are reproduced by graphic de-
scriptions, colored but, withal, creating a pen portrait of plaintiff." It
was alleged that the book was widely sold and read by the public in the
county and state where she lived. Calling her by her first name, the
plaintiff is described as "an ageless spinster resembling an angry and effi-
cient canary. She manages her orange grove and as much of the village
and county as needs management or will submit to it."4 It was written
that those she helped were cursed loudly while being helped with their
troubles. Indeed throughout the book she is represented as habitually
43. Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., Inc., 166 Ore. 482, 503-04, 113 P.2d 438, 447 (1941).
44. McGovern v. Van Riper, 137 N.J. Eq. 24, 43 A.2d 514 (Ch. 1945).
45. 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243 (1944).
46. Id. at 202, 20 So. 2d at 245
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using profane language, dirty and vulgar expressions, while full of good
works. But, as the court says, her neighbors knew of her good works as
well as her eccentricities, and the public outside would not have known
that the person described in the book was a real, not a fictitious, character
if it had not been for the lawsuit. The court sustained demurrers to each
of four counts of the declaration. This was affirmed as to three. But
as to the count which set up what is sketched above, the judgment was
reversed and the case sent back to be tried. The question on that count
is perhaps really one of the measure of damages.
A good example of limitation of the interest in privacy in view of
legitimate public interest in events "part of the history of the community"
was decided by a court47 which had previously upheld the right in a proper
case. A man disappeared under circumstances strongly indicating that he
was murdered and the money he was known to have with him stolen, but
the body was not found. Suspicion pointed to a man who had found the
horses the supposed deceased had been driving when he disappeared, and
he was prosecuted and acquitted. Twenty-five years later it appeared that
the supposed murdered man had gone secretly to California, where he had
accumulated property and died leaving a will in which one of his two
daughters in Alabama was the principal beneficiary. This story was told
by defendant fully but not unfairly in a weekly news broadcast program
called '" uscaloosa Town Talks." The consequent widespread notoriety
and comment were very humiliating and painful to the daughters, who
brought suit. The court admitted the existence of such a right, but de-
nied an action on the ground that "the broadcast was the subject of legiti-
mate public interest." The story "is a part of the history of the com-
munity."
ENCROACHMENT UPON THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
By Advertisers
In a case4' after the right of privacy was becoming well established
in the American state courts, the Supreme Court of Michigan distin-
guished and refused to follow Atkinson v. John E. Doherty & Co.,49
which had been relied upon by the New York Court of Appeals in reject-
ing the right of privacy. The facts in the case which has established the
law in Michigan were that defendant, without the knowledge or consent
of the plaintiff, obtained her photograph from a photographer and pub-
lished it in a daily newspaper in an advertisement of cosmetics kept for
sale by the defendant. The advertisement was eight by ten inches and
47. Smith v. Doss, 251 Ala. 250, 253, 37 So. 2d 118, 121 (1948).
48. Pallas v. Crowley, Milner & Co., 322 Mich. 411, 33 N.W.2d 911 (1948).
49. 121 Mich. 372, 80 N.W. 285 (1899).
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featured the photograph of plaintiff surrounded by printed matter de-
scribing brands of rouge, lipstick, and make up, by drawings of a bottle
of make up, a lipstick container, and a rouge container, and an announce-
ment that such articles were on sale at defendant's store. The case was
dismissed by the trial court. The judgment was reversed, the court saying
that there was
a fundamental difference between the use of a person's photographic
likeness in connection with or as a part of a legitmate news item in a
newspaper, and its commercial use in an advertisement for the pecuniary
gain of the user. In the case at bar there is no involvement of free-
dom of speech or freedom of the press.5"
Continental Optical Company v. Reed5' involved loss or limitation of
the right by "becoming a public personage." Plaintiff, an optical lens
grinder, was inducted into the United States Army in World War II and
attached to a mobile optical unit which operated near the front lines in
France to supply and repair lenses for military use. He was used as a
lens grinder in that unit. While he was so engaged the War Department
took his picture for the purpose of publication in the United States as a
news item in the Army's plan for bolstering home-front morale. Accord-
ingly the picture was released by the Office of War Information and ap-
peared in one or more publications, one of them a newspaper in plain-
tiff's home city. The defendant then appropriated the picture and used
it for commercial purposes in its own private enterprise of selling optical
instruments, representing that the plaintiff endorsed its products. De-
fendant's demurrer was overruled and there was verdict and judgment for
the plaintiff. The appellate court affirmed the judgment upon remittitur
of damages in excess of one thousand dollars. It said that when plaintiff
was inducted into the army and attached to the optical unit he did not
thereby become a public personage whose individual likeness, activities,
and character became a matter of general interest and concern. He was
"no hero, famous personality or individual of preeminent accomplish-
ments whose doings are items of legitimate news and general interest;"
the public could have no interest in him "other than as the symbol of an
organization with which it was greatly concerned." It said that the situa-
tion "cannot be stretched into a license to private business to use ... for
advertising its wares for individual profit."52
By the Press
There is a full discussion of the right of privacy as infringed by the
press in a case involving the publication in an illustrated periodical of
50. Pallas v. Crowley, Milner & Co., 322 Mich. 411, 33 N.W.2d 911 (1948).
51. 119 Ind. App. 643, 86 N.E.2d 306 (1949).
52. Id. at 650, 86 N.E.2d at 309.
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wide circulation of a surreptitiously and unauthorizedly used photograph
of plaintiff and his co-plaintiff wife with his arm about her and his cheek
against hers, along with an article on "Love," carrying under the picture
the caption "Publicized as glamorous, desirable, 'love at first sight' is a
bad risk.""3 The article goes on to say that "love at first sight" is the
wrong kind, is not long lasting, and will be followed by divorce. The
plaintiffs operated a confectionary and ice cream concession in a market
and each had a good reputation. The court took a strong position for a
right of privacy, which until then had not been established in California,
but worked out well the difficulties involved in relation of the right to
other recognized and legally secured interests. The opinion of Justice
Carter brings out well the conflicting considerations to be borne in mind.
A judgment for the defendant was reversed.
By Landlords
Definition of the right of privacy was involved in a case in which, in
a verdict for the plaintiff, the jury expressly found no "compensatory
damages" but went on to "assess as exemplary damages" a sum named.54
For the defendant it was urged that "since the jury assessed no actual or
compensatory damages against appellant, the verdict for exemplary dam-
ages cannot stand." The facts were that a landlord after serving an in-
valid notice to terminate a month-to-month tenancy, in which rent had
been paid, moved with his wife into the leased small house in which the
tenant and his wife were living, and lived there for seventeen days and
nights, interfering with the home life, comfort, and sensibilities of the
tenant and his family. The court treated this as an invasion of a right of
privacy. In the last century it would have been treated as aggravated
trespass upon the tenant's possession. To think of the interference with
privacy as the real cause of action is a significant example of the effect
of social change upon the law. In 1902, when Roberson v. Rochester
Folding Box Company5 was decided, the absence of any physical inter-
ference with person or property was deemed decisive. In 1952 the tres-
pass upon the tenant's possession of the house as an interest of substance
was ignored and five pages of the opinion of the court were given to dis-
cussion and exposition of the right of privacy.
STATUTORY PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY:
ITS LIMITATIONS
Rejection of the doctrine of a right of privacy by a divided court in
New York was severely criticized at the time and led to legislation in that
53. Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co., 38 Cal. 2d 273, 275, 239 P.2d 630, 632 (1952).
54. Welsh v. Pritchard, 125 Mont. 517, 241 P.2d 816 (1952).
55. 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
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state in 1903. As it now stands it has the form of three sections of the
New York Civil Rights Law.56 Section 50 makes use of the name, por-
trait, or picture of any living person for advertising purposes or for the
purposes of trade, without having first obtained the written consent of
such person, or if a minor, of his or her parent or guardian, a misde-
meanor. Section 51 goes into no little detail in providing for an injunc-
tion and for an action for damages in cases within the preceding section,
and also provides for exemplary damages in the discretion of the jury, in
case of wilful use of name, portrait, or picture. This was held constitu-
tional; the imposition of liability only upon publication of pictures taken
after the passage of the statute was not considered an unreasonable dis-
crimination." The statute covers only one of many ways of infringing
another's claimed "right to be let alone," and it is a curious commentary
upon the argument of the majority of the court in Roberson v. Rochester
Folding Box Company that recognition of a common-law right of pri-
vacy would give rise to endless litigation, that in fifty years after its en-
actment some one hundred and fifty reported cases under it had come
before the court in New York, whereas there had been a scant three or
four each in states where the common-law right obtained.58
There is more scope for controversy over interpretation of a line of
a statute than over application of a much judicially applied principle of
common law. Moreover, what is laid down as a rule in a statute does not
admit of adjustment or application to circumstances of particular cases.
This is brought out in a case in which the plaintiff willingly took part in
the taking of her picture and the court was satisfied she knew the use to
be made of it but the consent was not in writing. The court said the de-
fendant which published the picture "infringed technically" the plaintiff's
rights under the statute and, dividing three to two, reversed a judgment
of dismissal and directed a judgment restraining use of the picture. 9
After review of the decisions in New York down to 1955 Prosser
says: "Within the limitations of the statute to commercial uses, the New
York Courts seem to have arrived at very much the same conclusion con-
cerning the right of privacy that other courts have reached at common
law."6  Since that statement an important case has raised the question
again and been passed upon by a divided court.6 ' In that case a manufac-
56. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51, as amended, N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAW § 52 (Supp.
1961).
57. Rhodes v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 193 N.Y. 223, 85 N.E. 1097 (1908), aff'd, Sperry
& Hutchinson Co. v. Rhodes, 220 U.S. 502 (1911).
58. See cases under the New York statute set forth in N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51.
59. Almind v. Sea Beach Ry., 157 App. Div. 230, 141 N.Y.S. 842 (Sup. Ct. 1913).
60. PROSSER, TORTs 641 (2d ed. 1955).
61. Flores v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 N.Y.2d 276, 164 N.E.2d 853 (1959); 74 HARV. L. REv.
1238-41 (1961).
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turer of fireproof safes put forth an advertising circular in which it repro-
duced a photograph of a burning building and reprinted the news story
which went with it. It described the plaintiff's carelessness, which was
a cause of the fire. The court of first instance denied a motion to dis-
miss. The Court of Appeals certified the question whether the facts con-
stituted a cause of action. The court held that the question should be
answered in the affirmative. Chief Judge Conway said:
In view of the fact that defendant chose to reprint the entire original
news coverage of the fire, including the entire news account which men-
tioned plaintiff's name several times and described how either he or the
other person present started the fire by their carelessness or negligence,
in a circular designed for the sole purpose of soliciting purchasers for
the defendant's products, and since every fair intendment and inference
must be given to the pleading on a motion to dismiss for insufficiency,
we do not believe that it can be said that this complaint fails to set forth
a use of plaintiff's name which is a violation of his statutory right of
privacy as a matter of law.62
Judge Van Voorhis, for the two dissenting judges, said:
This is not a situation where particular individuals are advertised as
sponsoring the product or where their names or pictures are merely pub-
lished in connection with an advertisement rather than as participants
in some public event to which the advertisement relates.63
In 1904 Virginia adopted a statute in substance the same as the
original New York act, except that it provides for survival of actions up-
on it and limits protection to residents of the state.6" It does not seem to
have attracted the attention of the state courts but was the subject of an
important article in the Virginia Law Review. 5 Before the statute a Vir-
ginia court had denied the existence of a right of privacy at common
law." Hence the writer considered that the course of decision in New
York will be followed in Virginia.
Oklahoma in 1953 adopted a statute which is essentially the same
as the New York act.67 However, it not only provides for survival of
right of privacy actions but also makes the offense a felony.
Utah in 1909 adopted a statute of three sections of which two are
substantially the same as sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil
Rights Law.6" One section, however, is peculiar to the Utah statute. It
makes it a misdemeanor unauthorizedly to use for advertising purposes or
for purposes of trade the name or picture of any public institution or
62. Id. at 284-85, 164 NXE.2d at 857.
63. Id. at 287, 164 N.E.2d at 859.
64. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-650 (1950).
65. Note, The Virginia "Right of Privacy' Statute, 38 VA. L. REv. 117 (1952).
66. Cyrus v. Boston Chem. Co., cited in 11 VA. L. REG. 938 (1906).
67. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 839.40 (1958).
68. UTAH CODE ANN. §5 76-4-7, 8,9 (1953).
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public officer of the state. Thus the statutory misdemeanor covers much
more in Utah than in New York, Virginia, or Oklahoma, while New
York has since extended the misdemeanor to cover broadcasting, taking
motion pictures, and televising of proceedings in which testimony under
compulsory process is taken before any tribunal or administrative
agency.
69
In addition to what was said above as to the New York statute, it
should be noted that it fell far short of the purpose for which it was en-
acted. Instead of undoing the mischief created by Roberson v. Rochester
Folding Box Company7 ° and giving a general starting point for reason-
ing about a rapidly developing type of injury to personality in the chang-
ing social and economic order of the time, the statute provided a rule for
judicial relief for one particular type of injury to privacy. As a result all
development of the law on that subject outside of the fixed limits of the
statutory rule was foreclosed. Shortly after enactment of the New York
statute the tide of judicial decision recognizing the doctrine set in. Only
three other states have adopted the New York statutory limitation; only
four have persisted in rejecting a right of privacy; 1 twenty-six and the
District of Columbia have accepted and are developing it, and in seven
states there is good reason to assume it will be accepted by the highest
court.
72
JURISDICTIONS WHICH HAVE DENIED THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
Of the four states which appear definitely committed to rejection of
the right, Rhode Island passed upon it in 1909, 71 when the right of pri-
vacy was still a novel right not to be found in the orthodox expositions
of the common law. (Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Company in
New York and Atkinson v. John B. Doherty & Co. in Michigan had de-
nied it; only the article by Warren and Brandeis and the Georgia court
in Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance Company had accepted it.)
The Rhode Island court found no warrant for accepting it as part of the
legacy of the common law and denied any power of admitting it by judi-
cial decision. Introduction into the law of the state of any new leg4
right, not recognized as such in the received common law, was reserved
to the legislature, which had all the power of the British Parliament ex-
cept as limited by the Constitution of the United States or of the state."'
69. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 52 (Supp. 1961).
70. 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
71. Nebraska, Rhode Island, Texas, and Wisconsin.
72. The cases are collected in 1 HARPER & JAMES, ToRTS, 682-83 (1956); PROSSER, TORTS
636-37 (2d ed. 1955); Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 386-88 (1960).
73. Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 30 R.I. 13, 73 At. 97 (1909).
74. Id. at 30, 73 At. at 104.
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As to Texas, the situation is well described and commented upon by
Professor Seavey."5 A Texas Court of Civil Appeals had denied existence
of a right of privacy in Texas, saying:
Our Texas courts are limited to the enforcement of rights under the com-
mon law as it existed on January 20, 1840, unless changed, modified,
added to or repealed by statute. .... The right of privacy as such not be-
ing recognized under the common law, as it existed when we adopted
it, and our Legislature not having given such right by statute, no re-
covery can be had in Texas under the facts in this record.76
This assumes that the common law received in America was a body of
rules, rather than of starting points for legal reasoning. As Professor
Seavey aptly puts it:
Anglo-American judicial theory of torts is based upon a broad principle,
analogous to that stated in the codes of civil law countries, that compen-
sation is to be given for harm caused by another whenever it is just as
between the parties that this should be doneY7
This alone makes it possible for the legal order to keep abreast of its tasks
in a changing world.
In Wisconsin the question as to a legal right of privacy arose in 1936,
when it was received outside of Georgia only in Kansas, Kentucky, and
Louisiana, and was denied in New York, and Rhode Island, and supposed-
ly in Michigan. Defendant, which had a small unpaid account against
the plaintiff, caused a flaming orange hand bill to be printed and dis-
tributed stating: "Accounts for sale. The following accounts are offered
by the undersigned as agents for sale to the highest bidder." It gave the
name and address of plaintiff and twenty-three others and stated the
amount of plaintiff's debt as $4.23. It was held that there was no cause
of action for libel stated and the court considered that if one was to be
created for such cases it should be done by the legislature. 8
In Nebraska the issue arose in 1955. Following the pattern of Rhode
Island, Texas, and Wisconsin, the court refused to change the common
law as received from England, reserving the creation of new rights to the
legislature."9
75. Seavey, Can Texas Courts Protect Newly-Discovered Interests?, 31 T"xAs L REv. 309
(1931).
76. Milner v. Red River Valley Publishing Co., 249 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tex. Civ. App.
1952).
77. Seavey, Can Texas Courts Protect Newly-Discovered Interests?, 31 TExAs L. Rav. 311
(1931).
78. Judevine v. Benzies-Montanye Fuel & Warehouse Co., 222 Wis. 512, 269 N.W. 295
(1936).
79. Brunson v. Ranks Army Store, 161 Neb. 519, 73 N.W.2d 803 (1955).
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NATURE OF THE NEW RIGHT: ITS PLACE IN A COMMUNITY
OF COMPETING INTERESTS
Granted that there is now a common-law tort of invasion of privacy,
what is its exact nature and what are its limitations? Prosser considers
that it is a complex of four distinct wrongs: (1) intrusion on plaintiff's
physical solitude or seclusion, as by invading his quarters or tapping his
telephone wires; (2) publicity which violates the ordinary decencies
given to private information about the plaintiff even though it may be
true and no action would lie for defamation; (3) putting the plaintiff in
a false but not necessarily defamatory position in the public eye; and
(4) appropriation of some element of the plaintiff's personality for a
commercial use."0 Harper and James consider it "a catchall for a great
number of cases in which mental suffering or other emotional distress
was the primary injury sustained and for which no other substantive
theory for relief was available.""1 Is not the development of the right of
privacy a working out of the securing of individual personality?
How to adjust or reconcile the conflicting interests which must be
considered in securing privacy is the real problem. We have always first
to keep in mind the social interest in the general security. We have seen
above how the general security calls for finger printing and photograph-
ing of accused persons who may escape before conviction and yet have a
just claim not to have finger prints and photographs in rogues' galleries
when they are acquitted. 2 Again, the public health may call for the ad-
vancement of medical knowledge. But it is quite possible to meet the
exigencies of this interest and spare the victim of a shocking accident or
harrowing disease a distressing publicity not necessary for medical rec-
ord.8" A public interest in general information, strong in a democratic
polity, may call for full news of doings and events in relation to political
conditions and controversies, which nevertheless may not justify involun-
tary publication of unpublished views of private individuals seeking only
to be let alone.
Friedmann warns us that the law must respond to social changes if
it is to fulfill its function as a paramount instrument of social order.8 4
Prosser speaks of "new torts," recognized to meet conditions of life in the
increasingly complex social order of today.8  In the past the objection
has been raised, when adjustment of legal liability to changed social con-
80. PROSSER, TORTs 637-39 (2d ed. 1955).
81. 1 HARPER & JAMES, ToRTs 683-84 (1956).
82. McGovern v. Van Riper, 137 N.J. Eq. 24,43 A.2d 514 (Ch. 1945). See note 44 supra
and accompanying text.
83. Bazemore v. Savannah Hosp., 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930).
84. F EDMANN, LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY ix (1959).
85. PROSS1R, TORTs 3 (2d ed. 1955).
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,ditions was urged, that such adjustment would have the effect of produc-
ing a "flood of litigation" beyond the power of the courts to control. The
answer to this was given by Lord Holt in the famous case of Ashby v.
White: "And it is no objection to say, that it will occasion multiplicity
of action; for if men will multiply injuries, actions must be multiplied
too; for every man that is injured ought to have his recompense.'"" 6
Moreover, as to the bearing of the fourteenth amendment, the limitations
upon liberty which recognition of a right of privacy imposes have to be
weighed by the same measure in judicial fixing of the content and limits
of the right. From any standpoint the limits and application of the legal
right must be reasonable.
A leading case on competition of the individual interest in being let
alone and a public interest in news and stories of unusual or striking
personalities calls for special notice."7 Here a former child prodigy, Wil-
liam James Sidis, who at the age of eleven had been able to discuss
four-dimensional bodies with distinguished mathematicians, graduated
from Harvard at sixteen, and for a time attracted much deserved notice,
came to dislike publicity, strove to live unobtrusively, and for many years
succeeded in his desire to be let alone. But twenty-seven years after
graduation he was discovered by a news writer in his lodging in "a hall
bedroom of Boston's shabby south end" and written up in a series of
sketches of current and past personalities under the title "Where Are
They Now?" The article on Sidis was given the sub-tile "April Fool,"
his birthday having been the first of April; whether to show that as a
child he had fooled the public into taking him for a prodigy or that he
had fooled himself in belief that he could escape unwelcome notoriety
does not appear. In addition, an advertisement published in a newspaper
read: "Out Today. Harvard Prodigy. Biography of the man who aston-
ished Harvard at the age of 11. Where are they now?" It was not con-
tended that what was said in the article or in the advertisement was un-
true. "But," the court adds,
the article is merciless in its dissection of intimate details of its subject's
personal life, and this in company with elaborate accounts of Sidis'
passion for privacy and the pitiable lengths to which he has gone in
order to avoid public scrutiny ... may be fairly described as a ruthless
exposure of a once public character, who has since sought and has now
been deprived of the seclusion of private life.88
One would feel better about this case if the author of the article had exer-
cised what Mr. Dooley called "gintilminly resthraint."
Elsewhere I have said of this case, that as the injury was mental and
86. 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 955, 92 Eng. Rep. 126, 137 (K.B. 1792).
87. Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (1940).
88. Id. at 807-08.
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subjective, although it produced suffering more acute than that produced
by a mere bodily injury, legal scrutiny of the interest must be confined
to ordinary sensibilities. "Here, as in many other cases, in a weighing of
interests the over-sensitive must give way." 9  But as I reread this case I
have an uneasy feeling that we may have to curb to some extent the zeal
of column writers and producers of news reels to bring forth (to them)
profitable products at the expense of the timid who lack self assertion and
shrink from avoidable publicity. The needless slaughter of a bull fight
'need not be an analogy for the purveyor of readable items of news.
A legal right of privacy has been established in America by reason
applied to experience, and has become adjusted to and made compatible
with other rationally discovered and developed interests by like applica-
tion of reason to experience. The principle and its derivatives are clear.
There remains a task for further development of details of a doctrine
which must grow with increasing pressure of population and devising of
apparatus of publicity in a crowded world.
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
What long stood in the way of recognition of a right of privacy was
its departure from the analogy upon and about which our common law
of torts had developed, namely, the attack by one man upon another
recited in the old writ of trespass vi et armis. As short a time ago as 1861
a great judge laid down the rule that the law did not pretend to redress
mental pain "when the unlawful act ... causes that alone." 90 But in the
"endless race between the law and social change,"9 application of reason
to experience has led the law to see and recognize a wrong of intention-
ally inflicting mental suffering. The right here is limited to the person,92
and does not attach to a child too young to suffer mental distress,"3 or to
a corporation. 4 The right was discovered by reason, developed by rea-
son, and is limited by reason. Thus it is within the limits of the four-
teenth amendment, which forbids deprivation of the full freedom of one
who acts, otherwise than by due process of law, that is, without due
reason.
That amendment is declaratory of a fundamental proposition of what
may justly be called natural law. What it comes to is that all interfer-
ence by government with the natural freedom of the individual human
89. 3 POUND, JURISPRUDENcE 58 (1959).
90. Lord Wensleydale, in Lynch v. Knight, 9 H.L. Cas. 577, 598, 11 Eng. Rep. 854, 863
(1861).
91. FRIEDMANN, LAw IN A CHANGING SOCIETY ch. 1 (1959).
92. Lawrence v. Ylla, 184 Misc. 807, 55 N.Y.S.2d 343 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
93. Bazemore v. Savannah Hosp., 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930).
94. Maysville Transit Co. v. Ort, 296 Ky. 524, 177 S.W.2d 369 (1943).
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being is to be based upon a reasoned adjustment of relations and measur-
ing of conduct. No one is to be restrained in his full and free exercise of
his natural powers except upon a reasoned weighing of the interests in-
volved. For our present purpose, the constitutional proposition was
summed up by Mr. Justice Cardozo when he said that the phrase "due
process of law" exacts all that is "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty."95 What the fourteenth amendment demands of the courts in the
recognition and enforcement of individual rights was well put by Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in Wolf v. Colorado:
Due process of law thus conveys neither formal nor fixed nor narrow
requirements. It is the compendious expression for all those rights which
the courts must enforce because they are basic to our free society.9°
Subsequent reflection by the Court on what was decided in that case
does not affect the soundness of this proposition. Indeed, in Mapp v.
Ohio the Court said:9"
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared en-
forceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion
as is used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then
just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal
searches and seizures would be a "form of words," valueless and
undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human
liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from state invasions of
privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its con-
ceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing
evidence as not to merit this Court's high regard as a freedom "im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty."
A right discovered by reason, developed and shaped in its applications
by reason, and held by judicial adjustment to the whole system of recog-
nized legal rights by critical reasoning involves no quarrel with the
fourteenth amendment.
95. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
96. 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
97. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
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